Great Mutual Fund Clean Up That Almost Happened

April 4, 2004

The Great Mutual Fund Clean Up That Almost Happened 
 
The great mutual fund clean up appears to be petering out. 
Increasingly it appears that industry efforts to frustrate 
reform initiatives will be successful. We predict the 
legislature will ultimately defer to the SEC and the SEC 
will resume its ineffectual regulation of the industry. 
 
Let’s review the facts: 
 
First, at some point in time, if not already, Eliot Spitzer 
and other state officials will lose interest in exposing 
mutual fund wrongdoing. Spitzer was able to uncover so much 
malfeasance so quickly because it is rampant throughout the 
industry. All Spitzer had to do to surpass the SEC (and we 
do not mean to minimize his enormous contribution) was to 
establish an open-door policy, welcome whistle-blowing 
industry insiders and listen. When we met with Spitzer’s 
staff, we were surprised with their limited knowledge of 
mutual fund regulation. But what they lacked in knowledge 
they more than made up for in willingness to pursue 
allegations of wrongdoing and enforcement of the applicable 
laws. The SEC, on the other hand, has tremendous knowledge 
of mutual fund practices and regulation yet perennially 
fails to act. It’s as if the Commission knows about mutual 
fund wrongdoing but believes (or is persuaded by the 
industry) that no one is really being harmed.  
 
While it may not be apparent, Spitzer’s investigations have 
shown that many of the investor protections central to the 
mutual fund regulatory scheme are not working. His 
investigations have focused upon a limited number of arcane 
practices, however, what he has uncovered is pervasive 
disregard for investors. It is now abundantly clear that 
mutual funds are operated primarily to benefit their 
advisers and fund boards have utterly failed as watchdogs. 
As we indicated in our testimony before the Senate Banking 
Committee recently, the costs to investors is staggering. 
Skimming by the mutual fund industry is a significant 
factor in explaining why the nation’s retirement savers are 
approaching retirement with far lesser assets than they 
envisioned.  
 
Second, Spitzer has not, in the past nine months, succeeded 
in addressing more than twenty years of mutual fund 
wrongdoing. He only scratched the surface. As we testified, 
many other abuses such as personal trading by portfolio 
managers, underwriters parking investment banking client 
stock in affiliated mutual funds, payment of Investment 
Company Institute fees from fund assets, have yet to 
surface as concerns. Virtually every aspect of mutual fund 
operations needs to be carefully examined by eyes that are 
less forgiving than the SEC’s.  
 
When we met with Spitzer’s staff we suggested they review 
the “deficiency” letters issued by the SEC over the past 
five years in connection with the Commission’s mutual fund 
inspection program in order to determine whether they 
agreed with the SEC’s manner of resolving regulatory 
deficiencies the Commission staff uncovered. An effective 
regulator could spend years simply revisiting 
transgressions the Commission has already identified but 
failed to appropriately address.  
 
Third, legislators are not sufficiently knowledgeable of 
the arcane world of mutual funds to recommend meaningful 
change. Further, due to intense industry lobbying efforts, 
they are not prepared to undertake a serious, comprehensive 
review of the weaknesses in the mutual fund industry. 
During our testimony we were amazed that the Senate Banking 
Committee was willing to allow industry insiders to claim 
ignorance regarding simple matters such as the cost of 
executing a securities trade. If the Committee cannot find 
an answer to the question of the cost of execution, it will 
never be able to grasp the extent to which funds pay 
excessive commissions and fund boards fail to monitor 
trading costs. Our simple suggestion: Require industry 
insiders to take an oath before testifying.  
 
Fourth, the SEC will be no more effective in the future 
than it has been in the past. The reform measures the SEC 
has endorsed to address the scandals that have surfaced are 
preposterous. At the heart of the problem is the fact that 
the Commission continues to believe the legal fictions 
incorporated in the Investment Company Act of 1940, the 
federal statute that regulates mutual funds. The reality is 
that, regardless of what the statute provides mutual fund 
directors handpicked by fund advisers will rarely, if ever, 
be truly independent. You can change the definition of 
“independent,” require a greater percentage of 
“independent” directors on mutual fund boards but, at the 
end of the day, nothing will change. We can assure you that 
no consumer/investor advocate will EVER appear on a mutual 
fund board.  
 
The SEC proposal that funds be required to hire compliance 
directors that will report directly to fund boards is 
equally fanciful. A Commission spokesperson was recently 
quoted as saying that “Any compliance director that doesn’t 
do his job will risk ruining his career.” We can assure you 
that any mutual fund compliance director that DOES his job 
and rats on an adviser will risk ruining his career. Again, 
the SEC seems to be living in a fantasy world where 
whistleblowers are rewarded. 
 
In summary, mutual fund investors should not be lulled into 
believing that any meaningful new protections will emerge. 
The industry has not been cleaned-up and will soon return 
to business-as-usual. However, a bell once rung cannot be 
un-rung. Investors now have more information than ever 
available to them as a result of the mutual fund scandals. 
The public has gained familiarity with theories of mutual 
fund malfeasance that previously had not been discussed. 
Investors now know that funds are not inherently safe and 
that they should always be on the alert for self-dealing by 
advisers, brokers and other intermediaries. Investors 
should seek to identify the “hidden financial incentives” 
related to every investment service they purchase.  
 
Thankfully, reforms may provide investors with a better 
understanding of the costs related to investing in funds. 
Cost information alone should expose some of the industry’s 
greediest firms. Greater disclosure of the costs related to 
investing in funds will likely be the one significant 
benefit arising from the scandals.  
 
As The Ratings Firms Soundly Slept 
 
Finally, little attention has been paid to the failure of 
the so-called mutual fund ratings firms to predict any of 
the scandals. Over the years these firms have followed a 
course of avoidance of critical commentary on the industry 
and have crafted their ratings to provide maximum marketing 
value to funds. Catering to the industry in pursuit of 
profits, integrity and accountability to investors was 
abandoned. Investors who have relied upon these firms’ 
ratings have generally been disappointed. Today these firms 
are advising investors regarding a host of legal, ethical 
and operational mutual fund issues that they are simply 
unqualified to comment upon. Already they are telling 
investors it is safe to return to funds that admitted to 
serious wrongdoing only a few months ago. Investors 
hopefully will remember these so-called rating firms should 
not be unduly relied upon. They failed to anticipate the 
last scandals and they cannot be relied upon to predict the 
next.  
 
Update From Dow Jones Business News 
 
Chattanooga Probes Pension Work by UBS, Morgan Stanley  
By Arden Dale 
22 April 2004 
 
(c) 2004 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.  
 
NEW YORK -- The city of Chattanooga, Tenn., has hired an 
investigator to review the way UBS AG's (UBS) UBS Financial 
Services and Morgan Stanley (MWD) acted in their role as 
consultants to its $180 million pension fund in recent 
years. The move comes as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission is looking into possible conflicts of interest 
in the pension-consulting business.  
 
UBS Financial, then known as UBS PaineWebber, advised the 
Chattanooga fund between 1996 and 2000, and Morgan Stanley 
held the position from 2000 to 2003. Both firms declined to 
comment on the current review. 
 
David Eichenthal, Chattanooga city finance director and 
chairman of the pension-fund board, said the city has 
retained former SEC attorney Edward A.H. Siedle to look 
into the firms' activities during the period in question. 
The probe began several months ago and is expected to 
conclude by the end of the year.  
 
"The purpose of the review is to go back and look at the 
plan's prior performance as part of an overall effort of 
the board to take stock," said Mr. Eichenthal.  
 
He said most of the seven-member board of the general 
pension plan of the city of Chattanooga have been appointed 
within the past year or two. The fund covers city 
employees, excluding police and firemen. Like most public 
funds, it sustained significant losses in recent years due 
to market conditions, but has rebounded in 2004.  
 
Mr. Eichenthal declined to comment on the exact nature of 
the review, but said Mr. Siedle's work with a nearby 
pension prompted the city to hire him. Specifically, Mr. 
Siedle had a hand in winning one of the few known 
settlements related to conflicts of interest in the 
pension-consulting arena, a $10.3 million payment by UBS to 
the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson 
County in 2002. UBS was a consultant to Nashville's pension 
fund.  
 
"We were aware of his work in Nashville and with some other 
funds, and we thought he would be appropriate for the type 
of review we were looking for," said Mr. Eichenthal.  
 
Mr. Siedle started the Nashville probe after a KPMG LLP 
report to the city raised a number of concerns about 
possible conflicts of interest. For example, it noted that 
UBS was paid by Nashville in brokerage commissions, and had 
"provided the board with misleading information, resulting 
in board decisions that generated higher commissions."  
 
Alleged conflicts by consultants can take several forms, 
but they all come back to the powerful influence 
consultants wield over investment officials at pension 
funds. These officials - mostly at public funds - rely 
heavily on their consultants as the gatekeepers who tell 
them which money managers to hire. In turn, the argument 
goes, money managers feel pressure to "pay to play," or 
give kickbacks of various forms to consultants in return 
for recommendations to pension boards.  
 
A big concern is that some consultants may direct 
above-market brokerage trades to their affiliates, 
collecting so-called "soft dollar" payments that can add up 
to huge sums that go unreported as revenue.  
 
"Most of the major wirehouses have an elite core of 
high-producing brokers that they hold out to the public as 
being pension experts," said Mr. Siedle, who confirmed the 
review but declined to disclose details.  
 
Mr. Siedle now owns Benchmark Financial Services, an Ocean 
Ridge, Fla., company, which he describes as a broker-dealer 
that provides investment-banking services, securities 
trading and specialized consulting, or investigative work. 
He said he has been getting more calls from city and state 
pension funds since the SEC began looking into pension 
consulting. The SEC initiated its look with a Dec. 12 
letter to many investment-advisory f irms, seeking a wide 
range of information on their activities during the period 
between Jan. 1, 2002, and Nov. 30, 2003. The SEC said it is 
"examining the practices, compensation arrangements and 
disclosures of consultants that provide services to 
sponsors of defined-benefit and defined-contribution 
pension plans or other market participants."  
 
Of particular interest to the SEC are "practices with 
respect to advice regarding the selection of investment 
advisers to manage plan assets; selection of other service 
providers such as administrators, custodians, investment 
research firms and broker-dealers; and services other than 
investment consulting provided to plan sponsors, investment 
advisors and mutual funds."  
 
Lori A. Richards, director of the SEC's office of 
compliance inspections and examinations, said earlier this 
month that the examination is continuing but didn't give a 
time frame for completing it.  
 
Nearly half of all pension-plan sponsors with $100 million 
or more use 
investment consultants, according to a 2003 survey by 
Nelson Information, a division of Thomson Financial. Marsh 
& McLennan Cos. (MMC) Mercer Investment Consulting Inc., 
Callan Associates Inc., Russell Investment Group, Wilshire 
Associates and Segal Advisors Inc. are among leaders in the 
field.


Setting Standards For The Investment Management Industry

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