Compelling Pension Consultant Disclosure

June 1, 2002

The President of the Board of Trustees of a large pension 
fund remarked to me last week that she was not concerned 
about the brokerage, conference fees and other compensation 
her fund's consultant was earning from the fund's money 
managers. The conflict of interest created by the pension 
consultant receiving compensation from the fund's managers, 
while serving as the supposedly objective evaluator of 
these managers and any new managers the fund might hire, 
was not troubling to her for two reasons, she said. 
 
First, as she saw it, "everyone in this business is dirty." 
By "dirty" she did not mean everyone was necessarily 
involved in illegal conduct; rather, it became clear she 
was referring to the prevalence of conflicts of interest in 
the industry. Second, she was not concerned about her 
investment consultant's alternative sources of compensation 
because she was confident the amount of any undisclosed 
compensation was insignificant. Her consultant had assured 
her the firm's involvement in brokerage was limited. 
According to the consultant, the firm only operated the 
affiliated brokerage as a "convenience to its clients who 
were interested in commission recapture and similar 
cost-reduction services." Finally, in the President's 
opinion, since the fund's Board members had also attended 
the consultant's annual client conference that money 
managers had paid $50,000 each to attend, there was no need 
for any additional disclosure regarding manager payment of 
conference fees. 
 
Prevalence of Conflicts of Interest 
 
The trustee's remarks struck me as remarkable reasoning. 
The investment management and securities industry is 
clearly riddled with conflicts of interest. Conflicts exist 
within securities firms, such as between research analysts 
and investment bankers or between a firm's proprietary 
trading and trading on behalf of customers. Conflicts also 
can be found when firms pursue different lines of business 
through affiliated companies. For example, some money 
managers engage in business with affiliated brokerages, 
including executing of customer trades and purchasing of 
IPOs underwritten by the affiliate for customer accounts. 
Some pension consulting firms have affiliated brokerages 
and money management firms. Given the pervasiveness of 
conflicts in the industry, is there any reason why a 
pension trustee should be especially concerned about 
consultant conflicts?  
 
Basic Rules for Handling Conflicts of Interest 
 
There are a few rules which apply to handling conflict of 
interest matters which are really just common sense. The 
first rule is that conflicts should be avoided where 
possible. If the product or service can be obtained from a 
source that is not subject to a conflict of interest, that 
source should be given preference. In other words, 
conflicts should only be tolerated where necessary. Absent 
a showing of necessity, go with the provider that does not 
pose the risk of harm the other provider, subject to the 
conflict of interest, poses. Second, the greater the degree 
of influence the individual or firm exercises over the 
investment outcome (or alternatively, the greater the risk 
of harm such an individual or firm poses), the greater the 
degree of scrutiny that should be brought to bear and the 
less conflicts of interest should be tolerated. For 
example, while we may tolerate an elected official 
investing in equities with limited disclosure, we would be 
far more concerned with Alan Greenspan's personal 
investing. Many investment professionals and pension 
trustees fail to keep these rules for analyzing conflicts 
in mind. In summary, when possible, conflicts should be 
avoided and only the least potentially harmful conflicts 
should be tolerated. 
 
Should We Tolerate Pension Consultant Conflicts? 
 
If you apply the above rules to pension consultant 
conflicts of interest, the correct course of action is 
obvious. There are many highly qualified consultants who 
are truly independent. Thus, it is not true that the 
conflicts of interest related to the alternative lines of 
business certain consultants pursue are unavoidable. How 
significant are the risks involved? The consultant occupies 
a unique position. He or she is the one expert the trustees 
of a pension fund rely upon for objective advice on 
virtually any matter involving investment of the fund's 
assets. The relationship between consultant and pension 
client is one of utmost trust and confidence. As a result 
of his role as an objective guide, the consultant arguably 
exerts the greatest degree of influence over the investment 
process. So significant is Board reliance upon consultants' 
opinions that we have seen Boards accept assurances from 
their consultants that even the most outrageous 
self-dealing scenarios involving the consultant should be 
of no concern to the Board. In summary, the potential for 
harm is so great when consultants are subject to conflicts 
that consultant conflicts should be avoided most of all. 
Any hint or suggestion that the consultant's ability to 
provide independent, objective advice may be compromised 
should be thoroughly examined before it is dismissed. 
 
Investigating Consultant Abuses  
 
The opportunity always exists for pension consultants to 
derive financial benefit in connection with the decisions 
of their pension clients. The greater the degree of 
influence the consultant has, the greater the opportunity 
for financial reward. Thus, consultants often seek to 
enhance their influence with funds through a variety of 
devices such as limiting manager access to fund boards and 
selective disclosure of information regarding managers to 
boards. Another common device for enhancing influence is 
withholding information regarding matters to be decided by 
a board until immediately before or at the meeting where a 
decision is required. Since the board has not had an 
opportunity to consider the matter, it is likely to "rubber 
stamp" the consultant's recommendation. We have found that 
consultants are generally very astute regarding the 
procedural devices they can employ to enhance their 
influence over the decisions of their pension clients. 
Pensions, on the other hand, are often oblivious as to 
these procedural shenanigans. 
 
Seven Ways Consultants Financially Benefit From Funds 
 
There are myriad ways in which a pension consultant may 
derive financial benefit from a pension fund it advises. 
When we investigate consultant abuses on behalf of pensions 
we look for the following methods of financial enrichment, 
some of which are legitimate, while others raise serious 
concerns. 
 
First, a consultant may receive an expressly stated annual 
contractual fee or retainer. This fee may be paid directly 
by the client or indirectly with the fund's brokerage 
commissions through "soft dollars." In some cases, believe 
it or not, the consultant's fee is structured such that the 
consultant receives all brokerage the fund's portfolio 
generates as its fee. That is, the consultant's fee is 
limited only by the amount of turnover a pension's 
portfolio generates. This open-ended or unlimited fee 
structure is common among broker-consultants at the large 
wirehouses who tend to prey upon smaller funds. It 
obviously encourages the consultant to "churn" managers. 
 
Second, a consultant may receive an agreed upon fee (in 
addition to an annual retainer) for special projects, such 
as manager searches or brokerage studies. 
 
Third, a consultant may receive brokerage from the fund's 
money managers related to the accounts they manage for the 
fund. Note: even if trade confirmations do not state the 
consultant's affiliated brokerage's name that does not mean 
that the consultant's brokerage has not received the 
commissions. There are ways to conceal what party 
ultimately receives the commissions.  
 
Fourth, a consultant may ask for and receive additional 
brokerage from other accounts of the fund's managers. Where 
the plan sponsor has already instructed managers to direct 
brokerage to the consultant related to the fund's account 
to pay the consultant's fee on a "soft dollar" basis, the 
consultant is in a strong position to ask for additional 
brokerage from other accounts of the fund's managers. 
Simply put, the consultant's entitlement to brokerage 
related to the fund's account has already been established 
by the client. Not having to ask managers for that 
brokerage, the consultant has the leverage to ask for 
additional commissions from the manager in return for 
bringing the account to the manager. Soliciting brokerage 
from other accounts managed by the fund's managers is a 
popular strategy when the consultant knows he will be 
questioned by the plan sponsor regarding any brokerage 
received in connection with the fund's accounts. In this 
fourth situation the consultant is earning additional 
compensation from the manager, not the fund itself. 
However, the consultant's status as gatekeeper to the fund 
enables the consultant to effectively negotiate with the 
manager for this additional brokerage. The manager, on the 
other hand, knows he must keep the consultant happy and 
hopes to obtain additional assets to manage by giving 
additional brokerage to the consultant. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to consider this additional brokerage paid to 
consultants in estimating the total compensation a 
consultant derives from its relationship with a fund.  
 
Fifth, the consultant may earn additional brokerage from 
terminating managers and funding new managers. For 
consultants that charge "search fees" in addition to annual 
retainers, both commissions and search fees are possible 
when they recommend terminating a manager and hiring 
another. Again, the consultant benefits from "churning" 
managers. 
 
Sixth, the consultant may receive cash payments from the 
fund's managers, including venture capital and real estate 
managers or the custodian. This may be an agreed upon 
one-time, up-front placement fee and/or an ongoing fee, 
including a percent of the profits. Where the money 
management fees are unusual and high, the question arises 
as to whether the consultant may have received some portion 
of the manager's fee, one way or another. Recently 
consultant participation in the fees of defunct hedge funds 
is attracting scrutiny. 
 
Seventh, the consultant may sell marketing consulting 
services to managers (including how managers should market 
themselves to consultants) and host conferences where 
managers can meet pension clients of the consultant. Note: 
the fees consultants charge managers for marketing 
consulting services and conference attendance are well in 
excess of usual marketing consulting services and 
conference fees. For example, while sponsoring a typical 
investment conference may cost between $5,000 and $10,000, 
sponsoring a consultant's conference will cost $50,000 or 
more. With respect to this final category of fees, these 
fees are not derived from funds directly. However, the 
consultant's status as gatekeeper to pensions enables it to 
persuasively solicit such fees and these fees should be 
included when estimating total consultant compensation 
derived from funds.  
 
As a result of all the above devices, the fees pensions 
actually pay, directly and indirectly, to consultants are 
ten or more times greater that the amount they think they 
are paying. It's an elaborate ruse and pension officials 
almost universally have refused to look behind the façade 
to examine what's really going on. Our investigations 
reveal pension consulting fees today are dramatically 
understated. Consultants with no means of enhancing the 
compensation they derive from funds are forced to compete 
regarding the stated fee for such services, with those who 
are skilled at surreptitiously "working the relationship 
for all it's worth." This is unfair and penalizes the firms 
with the greatest integrity. In our opinion, we would like 
to see the stated fees significantly increase and 
surreptitious compensation outlawed. (For the record, we do 
not provide consulting services to pensions, only 
investigative services.) 
 
In this case the trustee was willing to believe her fund's 
consultant had limited brokerage operations without having 
been provided with any evidence substantiating this claim. 
As we have discussed before, all brokerages are required by 
the SEC to submit independently audited financial 
statements annually. While brokerages are not required, for 
reasons that make no sense to us, to disclose their full 
financial statements to customers, they are required to 
provide customers with summary financials. These summary 
financials are useless for due diligence purposes. 
Pensions, however, have the leverage to demand the full 
audited financial statements of the brokerages affiliated 
with their pension consultants and should do so before they 
are satisfied that their consultant's brokerage activities 
are not significant. Good luck.  
 
It is likely that the independently audited full financial 
statements of brokerages affiliated with pension consulting 
firms are the most closely guarded secrets in the pension 
industry. No pension trustee we've ever met has seen the 
financial statements of the brokerages of the largest 
pension consultants. Disclosure of these financial 
statements may answer once and for all the question of just 
how significant is the brokerage activity of the leading 
pension consulting firms. If such activity is minimal, then 
disclosure should be painless. In my conversation with the 
President of this pension I challenged her to obtain the 
full audited financials of her consultant's brokerage. 
While she assured me this would be a simple task, she has 
yet to obtain these statements from her consultant. We 
would now like to open this challenge up to the entire 
pension community. Can anyone obtain the full audited 
financials of the brokerages of the largest consultants? If 
you can, please contact us. Next month we may publish the 
results of this broadly disseminated request for 
information. 
 
If we don't take steps such as these today to uncover 
unscrupulous activity occurring at the highest levels of 
pension asset management, then pension funds will likely be 
the next Enron. Public funds in particular, which are not 
governed by ERISA and have lay boards, should be especially 
diligent in this era of heightened scrutiny of financial 
matters to investigate consultant conflicts.


Setting Standards For The Investment Management Industry

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